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FOR TLE RAMPART SCANDAL
Gary C. Williams*
I. INTRODUCTION
When disgraced former Los Angeles Police Officer Rafael Perez
made his statement to the court after pleading guilty to stealing co-
caine from a police storage locker, he uttered words that reverberated
throughout the City of Los Angeles as it wrestled with the enormity
of the scandal enveloping its chief law enforcement agency. After
reciting in sordid detail his descent into a life of deceit, crime, and
debauchery, Perez concluded his statement by declaring: "Whoever
chases monsters should see to it that in the process he does not be-
come a monster himself."'
The Rampart scandal, and the resulting investigations of the
conduct of officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD),
raise a disturbing question: Have the actions, or inaction, of the Of-
fices of the District Attorney and of the City Attorney of Los Ange-
les, created an atmosphere that allows the incubation of monsters like
Rafael Perez?
Stories appearing in the press in the wake of the Rampart scan-
dal indicate that many officers in the LAPD develop a callous indif-
ference toward the truth as they fight the war against crime, drugs,
and gangs.' These stories have revealed that some LAPD officers
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School. I want to express my gratitude
for the outstanding work done by my research assistant Min Tak. His work
provided much of the backbone of this Article. I also want to thank my friend
and colleague Laurie Levenson, for her commentary on these critical ethical
issues and for her input on this Article.
1. Rafael Perez, I Succumbed to the Seductress of Power, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 26,2000, at A25.
2. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, DNA Evidence in 4 Drug Cases Refies
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consider planting evidence, falsifying documents, and committing
perjury to be acceptable tactics in fighting that war.
Those press accounts suggest that, in some cases, attorneys in
the Offices of the District Attorney and of the City Attorney were, or
should have been, aware of police officer misconduct. In some in-
stances, judges or prosecutors dismissed the affected charges, but the
prosecutors did not report the officers' fraudulent conduct to the
LAPD, to the prosecutors' supervisors, or to other members of their
offices. In one case, it appears that a prosecutor proceeded with a
criminal prosecution even though he was, or should have been, aware
that the primary police witness against the defendant had severe
credibility problems.3 Another case raises serious questions whether
a prosecutor was terminated because he was too aggressive in uncov-
ering, and then revealing, evidence of police perjury.4
These actions of prosecuting attorneys invoke provisions of the
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct and the California Rules of Professional Conduct that impose a
special responsibility on prosecutors to bring or continue criminal
charges only when they are supported by probable cause.5 This Arti-
cle briefly discusses how that duty should be carried out when police
officers lie or shade the truth.
II. POLICE MISCONDUCT AND PROSECUTORIAL INACTION
INTHENEWS
Three news stories portraying the manipulation of the justice
system by LAPD officers present, in stark detail, the ethical issues
this Article explores.6 The first story comes directly from the
Officers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Lait & Glover, DNA
Evidence]; Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Two from LAPD Indicted in Alleged
Framing of Suspect, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Lait &
Glover, Two from LAPD]; David Rosenzweig, Officer Enters Guilty Plea in
Federal Case, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2000, at B1.
3. See Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Case Overturned as Fired Officer's Role
is Revealed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Lait & Glover, Case
Overturned].
4. See Lait & Glover, Two from LAPD, supra note 2.
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (1996); CAL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-110 (1989).
6. See Lait & Glover, Two from LAPD, supra note 2; Lait & Glover, DNA
Evidence, supra note 2; Lait & Glover, Case Overturned, supra note 3.
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Rampart Division of the LAPD.7 In July of 1998 Rampart officers
David Vinton and Scott Voeltz arrested two men on suspicion of
drug possession. The officers claimed that one of the defendants,
Antonio Nunez, spit bagged drugs out of his mouth as he was being
apprehended. When Mr. Nunez's case went to trial, the public de-
fender requested a DNA test of the drugs. The result of the test sci-
entifically excluded the possibility that Nunez had the drugs in his
mouth. The trial judge dismissed the charges.
After the dismissal, prosecutors were troubled by the officers'
testimony positively identifying Nunez. In fact, one prosecutorial
source said Officer Vinton's attitude "was so bad that quite frankly it
was as if he were lying."s Nevertheless, a few months later, prose-
cutors were back in court presenting testimony from the same offi-
cers about another arrest where a defendant allegedly spit drugs out
of his mouth. Again, DNA testing revealed the cocaine was not
coated with the defendant's saliva, and three months later, the
charges were dismissed. 9
In the third case, Officer Vinton arrested a woman, claiming she
walked up to his police car while he was parked and spit rock co-
caine out of her mouth, next to his door. This case was dismissed by
Sally Thomas, Director of Central Operations for the District Attor-
ney's Office, after she called Officer Vinton in and questioned him
about the story. In response, Officer Vinton told her that "[you] and
the LAPD were doing things the old way and didn't understand the
way things had to be done to catch these gangbangers."' 0 Ms. Tho-
mas finally reported Officer Vinton to his commanding officer,
Captain Robert Hanson, saying that she had serious concerns
whether Officer Vinton should remain on the streets."
Ultimately, this story illustrates what should happen when a po-
lice officer is caught lying or falsifying evidence. Unfortunately, it
took three instances of misconduct by Officer Vinton before a
District Attorney investigated his credibility and reported his




11. Despite this report, Officer Vinton was back on the streets within
weeks. See id.
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untruthfulness to his superiors. Although Officer Vinton was al-
lowed to return to the streets, there is no indication that lawyers in
the Office of the District Attorney and of the City Attorney were
alerted to Officer Vinton's perjurious method of catching gangbang-
ers.
In the second story, James Bryant was convicted of selling drugs
in 1997, and sentenced to twelve years in prison.1 2 A key witness
against Bryant was Officer Gustavo Raya of the LAPD, who testified
during the trial that he observed Bryant selling drugs to another man.
Just nine days before Raya testified against Bryant, the LAPD re-
ferred a potential criminal case against Raya to the District Attor-
ney's domestic violence unit.' 3 Furthermore, four days before he
testified, Officer Raya was suspended by the LAPD based on more
than two dozen violations of departmental regulations, including im-
proper handling of narcotics evidence and the use and possession of
drugs. Yet, none of this information was revealed to defense coun-
sel.
14
Bryant's conviction was overturned because Bryant, while in
prison serving out his sentence, read a newspaper article about
Raya's subsequent termination from the LAPD. Bryant then wrote a
letter to his lawyers and the judge who presided over his trial, in-
forming them of the miscarriage of justice.' 5 When questioned about
this incident, Prosecutor Paul Bronstein, who handled the Bryant
trial, said, "I never had any knowledge of this."' 16
A third story comes out of the Seventy-Seventh Division of the
LAPD. In this case Evan Freed, a newly hired City Attorney, was
assigned to handle a case charging Victor Tyson with carrying a
12. See Lait & Glover, Case Overturned, supra note 3.
13. See id. The District Attorney declined to prosecute the case because Of-




16. Id. It is hard to believe that an experienced trial attorney would not
make any inquiries into the reliability of his star witness before presenting his
testimony at trial. Even accepting prosecutor Bronstein's denial at face value,
one can certainly say that he should have known about Officer Raya's criminal
and domestic troubles before he presented him as a witness. At minimum, Mr.
Bronstein's claim of ignorance suggests a reckless disregard for the truth. See
generally CAL. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-110 (1989).
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concealed weapon.' 7 LAPD officers Edward Ruiz and Jon Taylor
testified at trial that they saw Tyson throw a gun down as the officers
chased him from the scene of an apparent robbery.
Freed realized that elements of the officers' story were suspi-
cious. The broken window that allegedly led the officers to suspect
that a robbery had occurred was in fact unbroken. Ruiz's report of
the incident stated that both officers saw Tyson drop the gun, but
Ruiz testified that only Taylor witnessed that act. Taylor testified
that although it was dark and he did not have a flashlight, he could
clearly see Tyson drop the weapon. Because of these discrepancies,
Freed decided to visit the scene of the incident. While there, he de-
termined that the officers could not have seen Tyson throw the gun
down because the alleyway was too dark at night, when the arrest
occurred. 18
The prosecutor sent a memorandum to his supervisors detailing
the officers' false allegations, as Freed felt ethically bound to seek
dismissal of the case because he was not convinced of Tyson's
guilt.19 After Freed's supervising attorney agreed, Freed moved to
dismiss the criminal charges against Mr. Tyson. When Freed pre-
sented his doubts to the trial court, Judge Kenneth Chotiner dis-
missed the charges against Tyson, and took the unusual step of de-
claring him "factually innocent," while praising Freed for his actions.
The judge also recommended that the LAPD Division of Internal Af-
fairs be notified of the alleged perjury.
20
However, the City Attorney's Office failed to take any action, as
recommended by Judge Chotiner. Later, when the Judge mentioned
to civil rights attorney Carol Sobel his decision to dismiss the crimi-
nal charges in the Tyson case, she reported the facts to the Office of
the United States Attorney.21 That office then investigated the affair
and brought federal charges against both officers. As of the writing
of this Article, former Officer Ruiz has pleaded guilty to violating
17. See Matt Krasnowski, Cop, E--Cop are Indicted in New L.A. Rights
Case, S.D. UNION TRIB., Apr. 6, 2000, at A3; Lait & Glover, Two from LAPD,
supra note 2.
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Tyson's civil rights, and the charges against former Officer Taylor
are pending.22
Freed was fired at the end of his probationary period, allegedly
because of questionable judgment in handling plea bargains and his
low conviction rate. While it cannot be said with certainty that Mr.
Freed's zeal in exonerating Tyson and identifying the errant officers
led to his dismissal,24 it can be surmised that Freed's actions were
not welcomed by the City Attorney's Office. In discussing the be-
havior of prosecutors in the Rampart scandal, Superior Court Judge
James Albracht, a former prosecutor, observed: "There is tremen-
dous pressure on prosecutors and judges to ignore police lying. A
young prosecutor who challenges a veteran cop's claim is 'dead
meat.' They'll complain to your supervisor: 'You've got some kind
of Jerry Brown liberal here.'
2 5
III. "TESTILYING": ITS EXISTENCE AND ITS ACCEPTANCE
The stories of police officers perjuring themselves to create
probable cause to support an arrest or the issuance of a search war-
rant are old news to anyone involved in the criminal justice system.
The practice was so common in New York that police officers there
coined a term for it---"testilying. ' ' 26 Judge Alex Kozinski, a very
conservative member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, stated
that the practice of police perjury is "an open secret long shared by
prosecutors, defense lawyers and judges.,
27
22. See Rosenzweig, supra note 2.
23. See Lait & Glover, Two from LAPD, supra note 2; Patrick McGreevy,
Suit Claims Hahn Covered Up Perjury: Man Says He Was Fired for Exposing
False Testimony, L.A. DAILYNEWs, Jan. 9, 1998, atN3.
24. In 1998, Freed filed a wrongful termination action against the City At-
torney's office, alleging in part that his termination was in retaliation for his
actions in the Tyson case. See McGreevy, supra note 23. That lawsuit was
dismissed in 1999. See Lait & Glover, Two from LAPD, supra note 2.
25. Ted Rohrlich, Scandal Shows Why Innocent Plead Guilty, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 1999, atAl.
26. See Eric Monkkonen, Crossing the (Blue) Line, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 26,
1999, at Ml; David Rohde, Jurors' Trust in Police Erodes in Light of Diallo
and Louima, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at B 1.
27. Rohrlich, supra note 25.
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Irving Younger2 described how he experienced testilying when
he was on the bench:
Were this the first time a policeman had testified that a
defendant dropped a packet of drugs to the ground, the
matter would be unremarkable. The extraordinary thing is
that each year in our criminal courts policemen give such
testimony in hundreds, perhaps thousands, of cases-and
that, in a nutshell, is the problem of "dropsy" testimony. It
disturbs me now, and it disturbed me when I was at the Bar.
... Our refusal to face up to the "dropsy" problem soils
the rectitude of the administration ofjustice.2
Recently, an investigation revealed that a District Attorney and a
LAPD detective were giving crime victims photographs of alleged
assailants before live line-ups were conducted. 30 When asked to re-
act to this impropriety, a source in the District Attorney's Office em-
phasized that "the defendants in each of the cases had long criminal
records and may have committed the crimes even though their cases
were dismissed [after the misconduct was revealed]., 3' This com-
ment, and the actions of the prosecuting attorneys in the cases dis-
cussed in section II, suggest that many prosecutors in Los Angeles
are willing to accept testilying, or at least to look the other way when
it occurs, because it results in convictions.
IV. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
My friend and colleague, Laurie Levenson, argues quite persua-
sively in this Symposium that judges must share some responsibility
for the Rampart scandal because they tolerate the practice of testily-
ing in their courtrooms. 32 That point is indisputable. Our system of
28. The late Irving Younger was a well respected professor of Evidence.
Prior to entering into academia, he was a trial judge.
29. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE
484-85 (1974).
30. See Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Role of Officer, D.A. Official Questioned,
L.A. TIMEs, July 19, 2000, at Al.
31. Id.
32. See Laurie Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial Responsibility for
the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 787 (2001).
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criminal justice has grown so cynical about this phenomenon that
judges tolerate the practice of defendants pleading guilty to crimes
even though they deny committing the acts with which they are
charged. This practice is so common that the plea has a name: a
"West" plea.33 As described in one news article, judges will allow
the prosecution to ask the defense counsel: "[I]s this a ... West plea
or is this a plea because the defendant in truth and in fact is guilty? 34
So long as the defendant answers it is a West plea, the court will ac-
cept the result.
35
The courts, by acknowledging the "open secret" of testilying,
yet doing nothing about it, and by accepting West pleas, have essen-
tially accepted the use of dishonest testimony and behavior by police
and other law enforcement authorities.36
Despite the courts' responsibility for the existence of these
problems, prosecutors are better positioned to prevent testilying.
First, judges are not ordinarily in a position to exclude evidence be-
cause of false police testimony. To do so, the judge must be able to
say categorically that an officer is lying in that specific case-a diffi-
cult challenge. In discussing the "dropsy" problem, Irving Younger
noted that "[o]ne is tempted to deal with it now by suppressing
'dropsy' evidence out of hand; yet I cannot. Reason and settled rules
of law lead the other way, and Judges serve the integrity of the
means, not the attractiveness of the end."37 Second, approximately
ninety percent of all criminal cases are resolved through plea bar-
gaining.38 Unless the defendant's plea presents a West problem, the
judge will have no idea that there is a problem with the police testi-
mony implicating the defendant.
Prosecutors, on the other hand, are in the best position to deter-
mine whether an officer has a dropsy problem, is "an expert on
33. See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385
(1970).
34. Rhorlich, supra note 25.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 29, at 485.
38. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1997, at 397 tbl.5.21 (Kath-
leen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1998); Warren E. Berger, The State of the
Judiciary-1970, 56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970).
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catching gangbangers," or is testilying in a specific case. Prosecutors
have access to most of the evidence, both tangible and testimonial,
that can reveal whether an officer's proposed testimony is truthful.
Prosecutors, if they so choose, have access to the personnel files and
incident reports involving officers who are slated to testify in their
cases. Thus, prosecutors can, for example, ascertain that one officer
has testified to exactly the same set of circumstances (such as spit-
ting out a bag of illegal drugs) on multiple occasions.
Prosecutors, if they choose to inquire, should be able to learn
whether an officer is the subject of criminal or departmental charges
that reflect poorly on the officer's credibility as it relates to the case
being tried. Also, prosecutors can meet with their police officer wit-
ness, discuss the case with him/her, and then make judgments about
the officer's credibility, and his/her willingness to lie on the witness
stand. No one else in the criminal justice system has this ability.
V. THE ETHICAL OBLIGATION OF PROSECUTORS TO ACT AS
"MINISTERS OF JUSTICE"
While the California Rules of Professional Conduct and Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct
seldom agree, they speak with one voice regarding the special status
and responsibility of prosecutors.39 California Rule 5-110 mandates
that a prosecutor shall not bring criminal charges when he knows, or
should know, that the charges are not supported by probable cause.
The rule further states that when the prosecutor learns, after charges
have been filed, that they are not supported by probable cause, the
prosecutor must promptly notify the court.40
39. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (1996); CAL. RULES
OF PRO'L CONDUCT L 5-110 (1989).
40. See CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-110 (1989). Rule 5-110
states:
A member in government service shall not institute or cause to be
instituted criminal charges when the member knows or should know
the charges are not supported by probable cause. It; after the institu-
tion of criminal charges, the member in government service having re-
sponsibility for prosecuting the charges becomes aware that those
charges are not supported by probable cause, the member shall
promptly so advise the court in which the criminal mater is pending.
January 2001]
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ABA Model Rule 3.8(a) provides that a prosecutor shall refrain
from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported
by probable cause.41  The comment accompanying Rule 3.8 de-
scribes a prosecutor as "a minister of justice" who has a specific ob-
ligation to ensure that guilt is decided on the basis of sufficient evi-
dence.42 An earlier version of the ABA rules, the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, explains that as a minister of justice,
"[lt is the duty of a prosecutor to seek justice, not merely to con-
vict.
43
What do these ethical rules mean? Courts and bar associations
have not interpreted these provisions extensively.44 The prosecutor's
role as a minister ofjustice demands, at a minimum, that a prosecutor
should not bring a case where he/she harbors serious doubts about
the credibility of an officer's version of an arrest or investigation.
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (1996). The relevant
portion of Rule 3.8 reads: "The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: (a) refrain
from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by prob-
able cause...." Id.
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (1996). The com-
ments to the ABA Model Rules provide guidance for the interpretation of those
rules: "The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the
meaning and purpose of the Rule.... The Comments are intended as guides to
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT, SCOPE (1996).
43. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981). Ethical
Consideration 7-13 cites Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), in sup-
port of this proposition. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-
13 n.24 (1981). An ABA opinion issued shortly after the Berger decision
summarized its import: "The prosecuting attorney is the attorney for the state,
and it is his primary duty not to convict, but to see that justice is done." ABA
Comm. on Prof'l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 150 (1936). More re-
cently, the Court declared "it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to rec-
ommend an indictment on less than probable cause." United States v. Lova-
sco, 431 U.S. 783, 791 (1977).
44. A LEXIS search conducted on November 1, 2000, revealed no reported
California cases interpreting Rule 5-110 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct. In discussing a case arising under ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.8, one federal district court noted that "few reported cases dis-
cuss the ethics rules governing prosecutors; as one commentator observed,
'there is an astonishing absence from appellate court decisions or reports by
discipline groups of cases dealing with misconduct by prosecutors."' United
States v. Acosta, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (citing Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 393, 445 (1992)).
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This duty is not satisfied when the prosecutor dismisses charges after
defense counsel has been lucky enough to discover a "smoking
gun"--evidence that the officer has lied or planted evidence. In all
circumstances of serious doubt, the prosecutor must refuse to pro-
ceed with criminal charges.
Also, the duty not to prosecute is not discharged when a prose-
cuting attorney simply accepts an officer's account of an arrest or
observation uncritically, even though it happens to fit the contours of
the latest United States Supreme Court decision relaxing the stan-
dards for probable cause or reasonable suspicion.45
Lastly, the duty to serve as a minister of justice is certainly not
discharged when a District Attorney presents testimony in a drug
possession case based upon the testimony of an officer who has been
suspended by the LAPD for suspicion of drug use.46 The California
standard for ethical conduct states that charges should not be brought
when a prosecuting attorney should know the charges are not sup-
ported by probable cause.47 This requires prosecutors to exercise
"due diligence" in researching the background and qualifications of
their witnesses. Thus, even accepting arguendo the prosecutor's
claim in Bryant that he was unaware that the officer had been inves-
tigated and suspended for drug use and other misconduct, the Cali-
fornia standard for ethical conduct was not met by the prosecutor.
There simply is no excuse for this kind of ignorance.
The ethical rules requiring prosecutors to act as ministers ofjus-
tice demand that they no longer tolerate the open secret of testily-
ing.4 8 Where prosecutors know, or should know, that an officer is
committing perjury, and that officer's testimony is pivotal to secur-
ing a conviction or preserving evidence, they must refuse to prose-
cute the case or refuse to introduce the evidence. Furthermore, the
prosecutor must document the officer's failing, and turn that infor-
mation over to the Police Department. The prosecutor must also
publicize it within his/her own department, and in the case of Los
Angeles, to their sister prosecuting agencies, to prevent finther mis-
carriages of justice. Supervising attorneys in the Offices of the
45. See Lait & Glover, Case Overtunzed, supra note 3.
46. See id.
47. See CAL. RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 5-110 (1989).
48. See Rohrlieh, supra note 25.
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District Attorney and of the City Attorney should, in turn, raise
questions about any subsequent prosecution relying upon the testi-
mony of the same officer. At the very least, supervisors should sug-
gest to the District Attorney or City Attorney responsible for prose-
cuting a subsequent case, that he/she should carefully check the
veracity of the officer's story.
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF PROSECUTORS' FAILURE TO ACT AS
MINISTERS OF JUSTICE
Why is it critical that we demand that prosecutors live up to, and
indeed go beyond, the duties stated in the rules of professional re-
sponsibility? As a result of the Rampart scandal, over one hundred
convictions have been overturned due to police corruption involving
perjury or planting of evidence.49 In at least ten of those cases, the
defendants pled guilty to criminal charges even though the arresting
officers committed perjury or fabricated evidence in the case.50
Why would a defendant plead guilty to a crime that he/she did
not commit? Because of the three strikes law,51 the law lowering the
standard of evidence required to secure an indictment, 52 and the gen-
eral willingness of juries to place great faith in the testimony of po-
lice officers, a defendant charged with a felony faces a Hobsen's
choice. The defendant can fight the charges, and run the risk that
he/she will be convicted despite the false evidence. At that point, the
defendant will likely face a judge who will impose the maximum
sentence allowed because the defendant has not shown remorse-for
a crime that he/she did not commit. 53 On the other hand, there is the
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West 2000).
52. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.8 (West 1985).
53. One graphic example from the Rampart scandal is Javier Ovando, who
was shot in the head by Perez and his partner Nino Durden. Ovando was then
framed, with Durden and Perez planting a gun on Ovando and then claiming
that he fired at them first. Ovando insisted to his attorney that he was innocent
and demanded to go to trial. Despite obvious discrepancies in the officer's
testimony, Ovando was convicted by the jury. Before the trial, the prosecution
offered to allow Ovando to plead guilty in exchange for a thirteen-year sen-
tence. After the conviction, Judge Stephen Czuleger sentenced Ovando to
twenty-three-years in prison. In meting out that sentence, Judge Czuleger
cited, as an aggravating factor, Ovando's insistence on going to trial. Judge
[34:829
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prospect of pleading guilty to a crime that the defendant knows
he/she did not commit, but receiving a much shorter sentence and
perhaps, depending on the negotiating skill of their defense counsel,
no additional strikes on his/her record.
Defense counsel have an ethical obligation to advise their clients
of the likely result should the defendant contest a criminal charge.
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4(b) and Califor-
nia Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 3-500 and 3-600 demand
that counsel inform their clients about all aspects of the representa-
tion, so that the clients can make informed decisions about the reso-
lution of their cases.5 4 For example, in criminal cases defense coun-
sel must inform their client about how difficult it is to discredit
police witnesses. Also, counsel must inform their client that should
the defendant contest the criminal charge and lose, it is likely that the
judge will impose a far harsher sentence.55 It is little wonder West
pleas are so common in our courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
One way to move towards eliminating West pleas and testilying
is to demand that prosecutors live up to their responsibility to act as
ministers of justice. The apparent existence of multiple "monsters"
within the LAPD calls for the offices of the City Attorney and of the
District Attorney, pursuant to their ethical obligations, to adopt new
rules requiring that prosecutors in each case carefully investigate and
evaluate the truthfulness of police officer testimony.
To guard against the incubation of even more monsters, rules
should be enacted requiring prosecutors, in those cases where they
determine that an officer has been untruthful, or has tampered with or
fabricated evidence, to inform the LAPD, their supervising attorneys,
Czuleger observed that "[m]ost apparently the defendant has no remorse."
Rohrlich, supra note 25.
54. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.4(b) (1996); CAL. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-500, 3-600 (1989).
55. Deputy Public Defender Tamar Toister, who represented Ovando in the
criminal trial, explains her ethical obligation this way: "My first felony trial.
Innocent guy gets convicted. Gets the maximum sentence. My third felony
jury trial: Innocent guy gets convicted. Gets the max. Now why would I tell
anybody, 'don't plea bargain because you're innocent?"' Rohrlich, supra note
25.
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and any sister agencies. The notice should identify the officer, and
their unlawful conduct.
The Rampart scandal, and the stories that it has aired about po-
lice officer tactics, pose a monumental question: Is our system of
criminal law, as it is applied in Los Angeles County, a criminal jus-
tice system, or merely a system obsessed with obtaining convictions
by any means necessary? Proper attention to, and application of the
rules of professional conduct by prosecutors in evaluating and han-
dling police testimony, would go a long way toward ensuring that
our system is one of justice.
The facts emerging from the Los Angeles police scandal further
illustrate why prosecutors must adhere to the minimum ethical stan-
dards demanded by the rules of professional responsibility. Prose-
cutors must refrain from filing or pursuing charges where it becomes
clear that the prosecution would be based on false evidence, perjured
testimony, or police misconduct.
In chronicling his fall from grace, Rafael Perez identified the
behavior which initiated his descent:
In the Rampart CRASH unit, things began to change. The
lines between right and wrong became fuzzy and indistinct.
The us-against-them ethos of the overzealous cop began to
consume me. And the ends justified the means. We
vaguely sensed we were doing the wrong things for the
right reasons. Time and again I stepped over that line.
Once crossed, I hurdled over it again and again, landing
with both feet sometimes on innocent persons.56
The Los Angeles Police Department and the Offices of the Dis-
trict Attorney and of the City Attorney should never allow police of-
ficers to step over that line again.
56. Perez, supra note 1.
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